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Abstract 
Many disciplines have contributed to the evolving understanding of trauma and oppression. The discipline 
of philosophy offers us the opportunity to ask the question: what should we be doing to create conditions of 
justice in communities where people have experienced trauma or oppression in relation to their identity? In 
this thesis, I will use philosophy to propose ways that we can ameliorate injustice in social and religious 
settings, particularly Catholicism. By examining historical and contemporary questions around identity and 
the self, I hope to begin to articulate both a specific problem in the Church and identify possible paths 
toward creating more just communities for people who identify as LGBTQ Catholics. 
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Introduction: The Elephant in the Room 
 
We are handed an identity before having a say in the matter, and we spend our lives 
running from it, pretending we have left it behind, or grappling with it as Jacob wrestled 
with his angel. 
 
Fenton Johnson, Keeping Faith 
 
 In July 2015, Deb Word, the president of Fortunate Families, a support group for 
Catholic parents that advocates for the church to embrace their LGBTQ children, was 
asked by the New York Times what she would say to Pope Francis if she met him at that 
September’s World Meeting of Families in Philadelphia.  She replied that she would tell 
the Holy Father “we don’t need to put this kind of trauma on a child’s soul.”1 
 In various ways, Roman Catholicism identifies justice as a key feature of both the 
communal life of the Church and of God’s relationship to individual human beings. There 
are explicit or implicit mentions of justice in Church doctrine, teaching, and practice. We 
find justice mentioned in various books of the Bible, “The Lord loves righteousness and 
justice; the earth is full of his unfailing love,” and Catholic social teaching that seeks to 
affirm and defend human dignity through confronting certain systems of oppression and 
domination.2 The Catholic world’s sustained effort for peace and justice is well 
documented, and an exhaustive depiction of its efforts on these fronts is unnecessary 
here. Sustained attention to justice is a worthy project. Yet, the Catholic approach seems 
to fall short in certain aspects of both the Catholic Church’s theory and practice of 
                                                            
1 1 Laurie Goodstein, “Gay and Transgender Catholics Urge Pope Francis to Take a 
Stand,” New York Times, July 28, 2015, accessed October 9th, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/us/gay-and-transgender-catholics-urge-pope-
francis-to-take-a-stand.html?_r=0. 
2 Psalms 33:5; Catholic Social Teaching Challenges and Directions, “Catholic Social 
Teaching”, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. 
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justice, particularly in regard to the status of women and the LGBTQ community within 
the Catholic Church.3 In this thesis, I will focus on the status and lives of LGBTQ 
members of the Catholic Church. 
Catholicism differentiates and excludes certain sexual orientations and gender 
identities that fall outside of the Church’s teaching that affirm heterosexual, consecrated 
marriages aimed at procreation and unity. Catholicism’s continual chasm between its 
LGBTQ members and the full life of the Church has emerged as an increasing source of 
conflict, disagreement, and tension, especially in recent years. As many governments, 
legislatures, and other Christian denominations and religious communities around the 
world have made greater overtures toward LGBTQ individuals and have taken concrete 
steps to integrate them more fully into the social fabric, the Catholic Church seems to 
have become harsher in how it treats its LGBTQ members in doctrine, rhetoric, and 
practice. 4 For every apparent opening, such as Pope Francis’ now famous quip of “Who 
am I to judge?” another story emerges of a gay teacher or vice-principal being fired from 
a Catholic high school by the bishop for marrying his or her partner civilly in their 
                                                            
3 I use the term “LGBTQ” throughout to refer to the broader community; however, I do 
not mean to equivocate the definitions, identity, and experiences of gays, lesbians, 
bisexual persons, transgender persons, queer and questioning persons, etc. I use it simply 
as an inclusive reference point. The nuances of Catholic teaching and practice toward gay 
couples transgendered persons deserve separate but linked examinations; that, however, 
will fall outside of the purview of this particular thesis. 
4 A few watershed moments and trends that come to mind are the June 2015 Obergefell 
vs. Hodges US Supreme Court Case that legalized gay marriage, state laws that ban 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and renewed affirmation of LGBTQ 
individuals, couples, and families within other Christian denominations such as the 
Episcopal Church, the Anglican Church, and the United Church of Christ. 
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personal lives, or of cold, unrealistic rhetoric yet again finding its way into papal letters 
and apostolic exhortations.5 
The disconnect between the teaching, rhetoric, and jurisprudence of the Church 
and the truths revealed by autobiographical accounts, relationships, and advocacy from 
the LGBTQ Catholic community is creating subtle cracks and psychic harms across many 
unique Catholic communities across the world. Seeking to employ both the 
methodological tool of problem articulation based in pragmatist, feminist philosophy and 
the relational, sacramental language of the Church, I will undertake a textual analysis to 
explore the delicate interplay between theories and practices of justice, identity, trauma, 
and oppression. By doing so, I hope to identify, articulate, and argue for the existence of 
a major problem in the way the Catholic Church treats its LGBTQ members. 
Additionally, as a cisgender, heterosexual male who has grown up in the American 
Catholic Church and remained active in it, I also write from a place of humility and 
caution, recognizing my status as an observer to the LGBTQ Catholic community. 
If the realities of the stunted life offered to LGBTQ Catholics are not 
acknowledged, apologized for, and ameliorated in a constructive manner, the social 
bonds and cohesion of the Church are likely to further regress. Despite this gloomy 
potential forecast, an examination of the growing body of literature and autobiographical 
voices from LGBTQ Catholics that affirm identity as both gay and Catholic reveals that 
the path forward lies in listening to the lessons about identity, harm, and healing 
                                                            
5 One such example of many firings, dismissals, and investigations is the 2013 firing of 
Mark Zmuda from Eastside Catholic School in Seattle, which led to continued protests 
from students, parents, and community members calling for his full reinstatement and a 
fuller dialogue over the necessity and injustice of the matter. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/21/seattle-catholic-schools-firing-gay-vice-
principal for coverage and links to other sources. 
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embedded in the stories of those people whose lives are often treated as paradoxes and 
foreign amidst the warmth of Catholic community. There is an uncomfortable separation 
splintering the Catholic Church, and it can be found in living rooms, high school 
classrooms, and confessionals. Its face is marked by separation, exclusion, and confusion, 
and it permeates the consciousness of LGBTQ Catholics, their family members and 
friends, and, indeed, all members of the Church in various ways. I argue that if one 
begins to look closely at this reality through the lenses of philosophy and narrative, both 
the inconsistencies and pressures that allowed it to spread throughout Catholic 
communities and paths forward toward healing, justice, and reconciliation emerge.
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Chapter 1: Justice Through Difference: John Rawls and Iris 
Marion Young 
 
 Justice is a mechanism to retain order, fairness, and a sense of moral rightness in 
society. Each society has its idiosyncratic history, rhetoric, and context for deliberating 
and organizing community life that is crucial to that society’s flourishing. In Justice and 
the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young proposes an “enabling concept of justice” 
that affirms individual difference and an understanding that the law should embrace the 
various embodied social identities of human beings.6 Young contrasts her vision of 
justice with John Rawls’s well-known theory of justice as fairness. Rawls argues that 
society must place fairness above all else in an effort to promote an egalitarian liberal 
freedom that ensures any question of justice that emerges from an original position will 
purportedly ensure all parties are “rational and mutually disinterested”.7 While 
acknowledging Rawls’ theory of justice as an admirable effort, Young still deems it an 
“utopian fiction” that hides the structural, damaging treatment embedded in systems of 
justice.8 She argues that a critical examination of our acceptance of justice as fairness is 
necessary due to pervasive institutional conditions of oppression and subjugation that 
deny individual difference. These conditions often debilitate and destroy the very justice 
that they wish to affirm and regulate within communities and societies. 
I will begin this chapter by sketching a brief outline of John Rawls’ theory of 
justice as fairness. Subsequently, I will contrast it with Iris Marion Young’s discussion of 
justice from her starting point that the “philosopher is always socially situated”, whether 
                                                            
6 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 39. 
7 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 13. 
8 Young 104. 
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they admit it or not.9 I will argue that Young’s position affirms that any particular 
examination of justice in community must begin by recognizing and rooting out 
oppression and social domination. Young celebrates the differences within and amidst 
diverse social groups and warns that laws and policies that advocate for the “melting 
away of differences” put certain groups at risk for oppression. In doing so, she outlines a 
vision for how specific societies can embrace and cultivate a thriving social ecosystem 
that respects group differences to achieve a more robust justice at that particular time.10  
Rawls & Justice as Fairness 
 Over the past several decades, Rawlsian fairness has arguably been the dominant 
theory of justice that has embedded itself in legal decisions, academic parlance, and 
political discourse. By his own account, Rawls set out to “…work out a theory of justice 
that is a viable alternative to these doctrines which have long dominated our 
philosophical tradition.”11 The philosophers that Rawls set his sights on were the 
utilitarians- such as Mill, Bentham, and Smith- who deftly advocated for the greater good 
of many, sometimes at the expense of individual rights. While Rawls recognized the 
intellectual weight behind their claims on morality and justice, he appreciated the 
contractual justice of thinkers like Kant and Locke and had a deep concern for protecting 
the inherent rights of all individuals amidst the chaos and tumult of organized societies 
like democracies. Therefore, his years-long development of A Theory of Justice centered 
on his desire for a way to bring all peoples to the same table when any difficult question 
arose surrounding right, wrong, and the just solution to a public problem. How could 
                                                            
9 Ibid 5. 
10 Ibid 47. 
11 Rawls 3. 
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different people- born into vastly different homes, socioeconomic statues, and 
communities- find justice? Moreover, is it possible for citizens with different agendas and 
deeply held beliefs, within systems of “especially deep inequalities”, to come together 
and arrive at a fair, acceptable conclusion for all?12 
To answer this question, Rawls created what he called the original position: the 
“appropriate, initial status quo” that ostensibly serves as an impartial arbiter in all 
disputes.13 To create this original position, Rawls conjures up the metaphor of a “veil of 
ignorance” that obscures any self-knowledge amongst the parties involved in the 
situation. To explain, imagine four hypothetical people sitting around a table somewhere 
in America: two men and two women. One man is a thirty-two year old investment 
banker that lives in downtown Manhattan; he identifies as Mexican-American, 
heterosexual, and single. The other man is twenty-five, white, and a young medical 
technician in rural Ohio; he’s gay, and has been in a committed relationship for several 
years. One of the women is a heterosexual, black college student studying physics; the 
other is a Seminole woman who’s a teacher in Florida, and is married to an immigrant 
from Iraq. All four have been pulled into a dispute that they must resolve fairly and in the 
most just manner possible. Rawls was deeply concerned that each person’s individual 
biased history and story- comprised of racial and ethnic identities, social ties, beliefs, 
values, and so on- would distort any attempt to see the fairest solution. Therefore, the veil 
induces temporary amnesia on all four individuals. Stripped of their identities and 
markers by which they approach life and decision making, they are theoretically free to 
                                                            
12 Ibid 7. 
13 Ibid 18. 
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deliberate, discuss, and reason their way to the fairest solution, all four knowing that they 
could be anyone in the world once they regain their memory.  
These four people are equipped only with the facts at hand and the knowledge that 
each of them wishes to obtain their share of the primary goods present in their specific 
society, which Rawls splits into two categories: the social primary goods of “rights and 
liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth” and natural primary goods like 
“health and vigor, intelligence and imagination” which are less tied to the process of 
deliberative justice.14 Interestingly, he also identifies self-respect as arguably the most 
important primary good; I will return to this later. For Rawls, the original position is the 
perfect solution to the inherent biases, inequalities, and injustices that distort individual 
rights within pluralistic societies. This new system sought to integrate both the standard 
utilitarian goal of maximizing utility at any given moment and the liberal foundation that 
earlier contract theorists had laid down. Each person, not fully knowing themselves but 
harboring an internal sense of the good and that each of them lives a markedly different 
life in a free society, should aim for the fairest solution that will benefit the least 
advantaged among them once they become themselves again; furthermore, their ultimate 
decision should have the least advantaged of the entire society in mind. To accomplish 
this, he lays out two principles that make up the foundation of any and every foray into 
the hypothetical room where deliberations from the original position occur. 
These two Rawlsian “principles of justice” that each rational decision maker 
utilizes in mulling over his or her course of action attempt to address the inextricable 
relationship between liberty and difference. After explaining them early on in A Theory of 
                                                            
14 Ibid 62. 
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Justice, Rawls defended, reassessed, and reflected on these two principles for the rest of 
his career in texts such as Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness. The first principle 
articulates that all citizens hold an “extensive” set of basic liberties that are to be 
defended at all costs, so long as they do not infringe on others’ liberties. Building off the 
first, the second principle addresses inequality. It states that inequalities should be 
tempered as far as they are “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged”, and that all 
public offices and positions be equally accessible in the interest of fairness.15 When 
employed together, Rawls advocates that the liberty principle and the difference principle 
defend each individual’s rights as far as possible whilst attempting to ameliorate, to some 
extent, the inequalities and disadvantages that arise among each person.16 In the hopes of 
illuminating why Rawls genuinely thought he was providing a paradigm through which 
all questions of justice could be laid to rest, I will give a short account of the second 
principle before moving to the first, since Rawls repeatedly states that the second flows 
from the first in what he deems a “lexical order.”17 
To illustrate the second principle, Rawls asks us to imagine the differences 
between the people that make up the entrepreneurial class as opposed to poorer, unskilled 
laborers. There are many factors that preceded this point in time for both peoples, 
including the specific community, class, and circumstances that each was born into. The 
second principle utilizes geometry and economics to remark that any initial or entrenched 
inequality is acceptable only if “the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the 
                                                            
15 Ibid 60; further articulated on 302. 
16 Ibid 60. The terms I used for the two principles- “Liberty” and “Difference”- are 
regularly used by scholarly sources, although some variations exist elsewhere. 
17 Ibid 42. In a lengthy footnote, Rawls explains and grounds the historical meaning of 
the lexical or “lexicographical” in the assumption that concepts such as goods, rights, and 
morals have relative degrees of primacy and importance. 
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man who is worse off, in this case the representative unskilled worker.”18 There are 
different ways in which the second principle can be interpreted, carried out, and 
established as outcomes based on interpretations of Rawls’ terms “open to all” and 
“everyone’s advantage”.19 They unfold in a relative sequence: natural aristocracy, natural 
liberty, liberal equality, and democratic equality. Rawls ultimately settles on democratic 
equality as the preferred and natural outcome for free societies and says that such equality 
flows from a healthy synthesis of the sub-principles of fair equality of opportunity and 
difference.20 Most of Rawls’ discussion of the second principle takes place in the realm 
of economics and utility, which are not the direct focus of our discussion of justice, 
though definitely related. Through this principle, he attempts to stem the tide of mass 
material inequality. He self-admittedly states that he is not entirely comfortable dealing 
with the different degrees of injustice that can ensure in free and materially unequal 
societies. He does, though, give a warning to any society that allows for inequality: 
The point to note here is that while the difference principle is, strictly speaking, a 
maximizing principle, there is a significant distinction between the cases that fall short of 
the best arrangement. A society should try to avoid the region where the marginal 
contributions of those better off are negative, since, other things equal, this seems a 
greater fault than falling short of the best scheme when those contributions are positive. 
The even larger difference between rich and poor makes the latter even worse off, and 
this violates the principle of mutual advantage as well as democratic equality (17).21 
 
Rawls admits the potential dangers of accepting degrees of inequality for the sake 
of the coherence of his system; however, this is another area where others have offered 
critiques. He recounts one critique, that “the final formulation of Rawls’ first principle of 
                                                            
18 Ibid 78. 
19 Ibid 65. 
20 Ibid 75. 
21 Ibid 79. 
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justice is stated as follows: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”22 
This first principle deals primarily with the actual system that governs and regulates free 
society. Rawls identifies certain liberties that are necessary for citizens to flourish and 
maximize their freedoms without infringing on the freedoms of others. These include: 
political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office), together with 
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom 
of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.23 
 
Rawls sets these out as his basic priorities for any given free society because they aim for 
a moderate Aristotelian path “between dogmatism and intolerance on the one side, and an 
a reductionism which regards religion and morality as mere preferences on the other.”24 
In examining the theories of justice that had come before him, Rawls recognizes a 
constant tension between the competing interests, beliefs, and desires in plural 
democracies and the primacy of rights or goods. In his view, societies grounded first by 
certain unalienable liberties would gradually harmonize and balance the good because of 
the urgency and relative equality of rights.  
 In sketching out the first principle Rawls names several contingencies by which 
liberties can be restricted; however, this restriction can only happen “for the sake of 
liberty itself.”25 These contingencies- that a person’s liberties can be less extensive but 
equal to all other persons, or that a person’s liberty can be unequal as long as their 
“freedom is better secured”- aim to address the obvious reality that inequality and 
                                                            
22 Ibid 302. 
23 Ibid 61. 
24 Ibid 243. 
25 Ibid 244. 
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affronts against liberties have existed in every human society that ever purported to be 
free. In the hopes of addressing the complex and often disappointing realities of modern 
society, these contingencies provide sorts of goals by which relative inequality and 
limited freedoms can exist and still hit the mark of substantive justice as fairness. In the 
same section, Rawls identifies further addendums to the primacy of liberty. He identifies 
two ways in which liberties might be limited that questions of justice perhaps cannot 
address.  
The first are the cases in which personal accident, history, or government limits 
liberty by necessary or reasonable measure; Rawls cites the “natural features of the 
human situation, as well as the lesser liberty of children” to explain these devalued 
freedoms.26 One easy example is society’s relatively accepted rule that people cannot yell 
“Fire!” in a crowded movie theatre or “Bomb!” on an airplane in order to falsely incite 
panic. Although this limits the personal liberty of speech, Rawls acknowledges the 
necessity for some order. There is obviously a tense grey line at the heart of these first 
limitations, and those debates have raged for centuries and will continue for centuries 
more. The second case he identifies, interestingly, is when injustice “already exists” and 
is brought upon certain individuals by others, either through intolerance, contrary 
convictions, or some combination thereof.27  
In this second limitation, Rawls freely acknowledges that his theory of justice 
cannot account for all unjust circumstances. However, his optimism and seeming shrug 
toward the realities and complexities certain structural injustice leaves a lingering 
                                                            
26 To read how Rawls has been critiqued for his treatment- or lack thereof- of justice in 
the family, see Susan Moller Okin’s Justice, Gender, and the Family and the works of 
Martha Nussbaum and Carole Pateman, among others. 
27 Ibid 244-5. 
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question as to whether an idyllic, rational, universal theory of justice is a desirable 
endpoint of the endless endeavor toward better, stronger, and fairer society. To quote: 
But men’s propensity to injustice is not a permanent aspect of community life; it is 
greater or less depending on social institutions, and in particular on whether these are just 
or unjust. A well-ordered society tends to eliminate or at least to control men’s 
inclinations to injustice, and therefore warring or intolerant sects, say, are much less 
likely to exist, or to be a danger, once such a society is established. How justice requires 
us to meet injustice is a very different problem from how best to cope with the inevitable 
limitations and contingencies of human life.28 
 
How can individuals and groups cope with injustice? Rawls identifies societal institutions 
as responsible for injustice; accordingly, we are to believe that the Rawlsian pursuit of 
justice takes place outside of those parameters. However, these institutions are willingly 
co-opted elsewhere in his work. He seems to say that structural injustice and intolerance 
that is aimed at certain individuals and groups of individuals exist, but it is a problem for 
a different place and a different time. This is a vicious cycle, because Rawls wishes to 
present a universal theory of justice that says to any society or community that counts 
itself as free and asks: how well are you guarding your liberties, and how best do you aim 
for fairness while tempering inequality? If Rawls is making normative claims by 
theorizing, it is troubling to allow him off the hook for recognizing these different forms 
of injustice but allowing them to still be part of the cohesive system. 
 As a final note, Rawls’ discussion of self-respect as “perhaps the most important 
primary good” connects to this thesis’s aim to examine how the Church affirms identity 
and dignity within its communities- or, perhaps, fails to do so. He writes that self-respect 
has two primary attributes: a sense of the person’s own value and his or her “conviction 
of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out.” Secondly and relatedly, the person 
                                                            
28 Ibid 245. 
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must be confident that he or she can fill out those intentions reasonably. 29 If we feel as if 
we cannot or should not fulfill our life’s aims- indeed, if we cannot conceive of coming 
close to an Aristotelian flourishing- then we may find that “desire and activity become 
empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism.”30 Rawls ties self-esteem to the 
interplay between regret and its deeper sense of loss, shame. Whereas regret is a general 
feeling of absence or missed opportunity, shame “implies a especially intimate 
connection with our person and with those upon whom we depend to confirm the sense of 
our own worth.”31 Rawlsian shame becomes moral for because it implies a failure to 
participate in the excellences of one’s own life and the lives of others. This, too, is 
different from guilt (although shame and guilt can be tied to the same characteristic, 
event, or action), because guilt deals with something contrary to the sense of “right and 
justice”.32 Shame moves even deeper in the soul and the psyche because they imply 
“blemishes in the person.”33 If the human experience of shame is undesirable and 
problematic within even a liberal Rawlsian system of justice, then warning bells should 
be ringing for any community that identifies justice as part of its bedrock. 
 Rawls’ overall effort toward a theory of justice, although substantive, is 
problematic. If someone wishes to offer a universal theory and method for justice, it must 
proceed from the acknowledgement of the messiness and irrationality of human 
relationships in social settings. Although Rawls offers a beautiful vision of reason and 
fairness in the pursuit of justice, grounded in the idealism those that came before him like 
                                                            
29 Ibid 440. 
30 Ibid 440. 
31 Ibid 443; Rawls mentions that his definition of shame is indebted to William 
McDougall. 
32 Ibid 445. 
33 Ibid 444. 
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Kant, it does not address how human beings historically have acted in community and 
continue to act today, even in spite of a growing value and care for reason. In order to 
combat systemic injustice such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and religious 
discrimination- which are directly tied to the material inequality that Rawls attempts to 
ameliorate in his second principle of justice- we must look at the reality of peoples’ lives 
instead of a purportedly rational ideal.  
With a simple yet profound way to defend individual rights and liberties and 
affirm pluralism at the same time, many writers have built on ‘justice as fairness’ and 
have applied it to many corners of society. Lawyers, policy makers, and judges 
championed Rawlsian justice, and the American legal ecosystem is infused with fairness 
from the top down. However, in order to get to the root of the interwoven injustices that 
face many groups of people in societies like contemporary America, we must turn away 
from Rawls toward a feminist philosopher that identified people through their complex 
histories, their relationships, and their bodies: Iris Marion Young. 
Young’s Politics of Difference 
 Unlike John Rawls, Iris Marion Young did not seek a unifying theory of justice. 
To her, such theories implied that one correct frame of justice exists for all time and all 
places, outside of human experience and history. This system “implicitly conflates moral 
knowledge with scientific knowledge” and assumes that any questions of justice can be 
divorced from the experiences that the given members of a community live through, 
whether positive or negative.34 That was not the world that Young lived in or wrote 
about. She reveled in the positive contributions and vibrancy of diversity and difference; 
                                                            
34 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 4. 
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however, she was disturbed by her increasing awareness of the overt and underlying 
oppression carried out against peoples on a daily basis. Given this sobering reality, 
Young sought to discuss and wrestle with justice without constructing her own 
universalizing theory. In her view, those endeavors- while taken up by many other 
philosophers and thinkers, and undoubtedly important- were neither entirely honest nor 
desirable. She dealt with an imperfect world that did not often live up to goodness, 
rightness, rationality, or fairness. Along with other feminist philosophers such as Susan 
Moller Okin and Martha Nussbaum, she critiqued Rawls because his work did not 
account for the very real biases and inequalities that were built into the structures, 
institutions, and assumptions that make up the original position. In their view, the 
perceived impartial sphere where deliberation takes place between fair, decent peoples is 
not very impartial at all. 
 Although important, if liberal fairness is allowed to be the culmination of the 
search for justice, something crucial is lost. Young makes it clear that we have told 
ourselves a narrative that we are on a gradual uphill track toward perfect fairness, 
equality, and justice; furthermore, if we reason and deliberate as hard as we can, we will 
arrive there quite happily and safely. At the beginning of the sixth chapter of her book 
Justice and the Politics of Difference, “Social Movements and the Politics of Difference”, 
Young makes the stakes of this mind-set quite apparent by reflecting on the stories we 
tell ourselves about justice and one another: 
Today in our society a few vestiges of prejudice and discrimination remain, but we are 
working on them, and have nearly realized the dream those Enlightenment fathers dared 
to propound…We tell each other this story and make our children perform it for our 
sacred holidays- Thanksgiving Day, the Fourth of July, Memorial Day, Lincoln’s 
Birthday. We have constructed Martin Luther King Day to fit the narrative so well that 
we have already forgotten it took a fight to get it included in the canon year. There is 
much truth to this story. Enlightenment ideals of liberty and political equality did and do 
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inspire movements against oppression and domination, whose success has created social 
values and institutions we would not want to lose…The very worthiness of the narrative, 
however, and the achievement of political equality that it recounts, now inspires new 
heretics.35 
 
These heretics are welcome and “endorsed” by Young because they wish to make the 
case that they are freer than they would be otherwise by affirming their differences and 
group identity, not by decimating them at the altar of the veil of ignorance.36 Black 
Americans, indigenous peoples, LGBTQ religious peoples, and scores of others who 
broadly fall into how Young describes social groups in Justice all experience various 
forms of oppression, domination, and marginalization in their communities because the 
differences that form their identities have been ostensibly swept away in an effort to see 
the world blindly and dismiss existent prejudices, hatreds, and power imbalances as relics 
of the past. I will outline Young’s main assessment and critique from Justice about the 
distributive paradigm and how it dismantles the “ideal of impartiality” that obscures and 
ignores human bodies, identities, and relationships. 
The Distributive Paradigm  
In order to have any conversation about justice, Young points out that one must 
recognize the common thread throughout the history of philosophy that skews toward 
equivocating questions of justice with questions of distribution. She calls this 
phenomenon the “distributive paradigm”, by which she means: 
…a configuration of elements and practices which define an inquiry: metaphysical 
presuppositions, unquestioned terminology, characteristic questions, lines of reasoning, 
specific theories and their typical scope and mode of application. The distributive 
paradigm defines social justice as the morally proper distribution of social benefits and 
burdens among society’s members. Paramount among these are wealth, income, and 
other material resources. The distributive definition of justice also includes, however, 
nonmaterial social goods such as rights, opportunities, power, and self-respect. What 
                                                            
35 Young 157. 
36 Ibid. 
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marks the distributive paradigm is a tendency to conceive social justice and distribution 
as coextensive concepts.37 
 
Rawls’ theory of justice and his two principles immediately come to mind. Through 
direct and indirect reference, it is clear that she has Rawls and others like him in mind 
here and throughout the entire text by beginning her entire examination of justice as a 
critique of the entire vantage point from which her predecessors had started. Young 
points out that this way of viewing justice is so pervasive and intuitive that most critics of 
an increasingly dominant Rawls-influenced liberalism still use the discourse of 
distribution to voice their concerns, from the socialists to the Marxists to the 
communitarian Michael Walzer.38 All of this is particularly troubling for Young because, 
intentionally or unintentionally, it recreates human beings as “nodes, points in a social 
field”, devoid of all of their human intricacy, messiness, and social context and 
relationships.39 In examining the implications of the academy’s collectively blind 
deference to the distributive paradigm, Young singled out two consequences that 
debilitated endeavors for more robust discussions and public implementations of justice: 
an ignorance of how discussions of material redistribution “presuppose and obscure” 
institutional context, and a distorted picture of how non-material goods- such as rights, 
self-respect, and opportunities- function in the lives of ordinary people in the real 
world.40 
                                                            
37 Ibid 16. 
38 Ibid 17-8. Young gives Walzer a bit more credit than her other contemporaries by 
noting his critique of “the structure of dominance itself”, which registers more soundly in 
the vein she writes in. However, she points out that Walzer, too, utilizes “the language of 
distribution.” See Walzer’s 1983 work Spheres of Justice for further reading. 
39 Ibid 18. 
40 Ibid 24-6. 
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 To Young, it is clear that distorted material distribution and inequality of wealth 
are deep injustices that need to be tackled in societies around the world. Critiquing the 
implicit portrayal of justice in general meaning solely those particular injustices does not 
mean that someone like her does not care about ameliorating grossly disproportionate 
economic and material wealth. It simply means that there are other pressing matters of 
justice in contemporary society that fall outside of this realm, such as the residents of a 
small town organizing and protesting against a waste treatment plant being built near 
their waterways and homes or another town being decimated by the major employer 
shutting down their factory without any consultation or warning. In situations like these, 
material compensation and jobs are conflated with “decision-making power and 
procedures”; racial and ethnic stereotypes in media, and corollary public aggressions and 
courtroom inequities, or questions about the “division of labor and meaningful work” all 
make up these injustices which are not tied directly to distribution.41 For Young, those 
who critique the distributive paradigm from a Marxist lens miss the crucial point that 
capital class relations and property are not the only contexts for domination.42  
By desiring a broader institutional context for examining claims of justice or 
injustice, Young means to include: 
…Any structures or practices, the rules or norms that guide them, and the language and 
symbols that mediate social interactions within them, in institutions of state, family, and 
civil society, as well as the workplace…insofar as they condition people’s ability to 
participate in determining their actions and their ability to develop and exercise their 
capacities.43 
  
                                                            
41 Ibid 19-20. 
42 Ibid 21. 
43 Ibid 22. 
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To sum up, Young identifies three clear non-distributive issues that can be addressed: 
decision-making, division of labor, and culture.44 
 The other part of her critique of the paradigm centers on her dismay at other 
theorists’ lack of recognition of the limits of distributive analysis. This lack of 
recognition “reifies aspects of social life that are better understood as a function of rules 
and relations rather as things.”45 For instance, she again critiques Rawls for talking about 
rights and duties as if they were objects that could be counted as they come off of an 
assembly line, or quantifiable units to be assembled, disassembled, and redistributed at 
will. By asking what it even means to distribute rights, Young points to her underlying 
charge that rights, duties, self-respect, and other phenomena are social and relational; 
they are “social relationships that enable or constrain action.” Power, too, is distorted by 
the distributive paradigm; while theorists often have good intent in writing and reflecting 
about how to better spread it around societies, Young contends that the very 
commodification of power as an object rather than as “processes”, then we will never get 
to the root of so many of the pervasive, intertwined injustices that exist. 
Breaking Down the Ideal of Impartiality  
 Later in Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young uses her claims about moral 
reasoning and notions of justice to specifically identify the problems with idealizing 
impartiality within legal systems and communities. Although liberal, impartial rights 
might make sense if justice simply is meant to deal with the “impersonal public contexts 
of law, bureaucracy, and the regulation of economic competition,” Young advocates that 
the relational nature of individuals and the social function of our identities make 
                                                            
44 Ibid 22. 
45 Ibid 25. 
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impartiality an errant aim.46 One key way that impartiality inhibits individual and social 
flourishing is its reduction of difference to a supposed unity that abstracts us from 
“situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view.”47 These things tie human beings to 
earthly imperfections and messiness, which contrast with the often impartial, theoretical 
abstracts that men have tried to cement as reasonable and ideal for centuries. This 
impartiality curiously appeals to the logic and tradition of the Church, which lives a dual 
reality between its pastoral rhetoric that appeals to people in a relational, emotional, and 
even loving sense versus its institutional law that ties a masculine impartiality to natural 
law that fixes the universe irreparably above and beyond the lived experiences of those 
below, including its LGBTQ members.  
It is the work of a separate thesis to fully examine and attempt to locate the state 
of justice in the Catholic Church. In the Catechism of the Catholic Church, a sort of 
official summary of beliefs offered by Saint Pope John Paul II in 1992, a vision of justice 
is offered that seems somewhat emancipatory and affirmative of the individual: 
1943 Society ensures social justice by providing the conditions that allow associations 
and individuals to obtain their due. 
1944 Respect for the human person considers the other "another self." It presupposes 
respect for the fundamental rights that flow from the dignity intrinsic of the person. 
1945 The equality of men concerns their dignity as persons and the rights that flow from 
it.48 
By employing the language of dues, the first sentence seems to conceive of social justice 
as primarily material, but also relational; the subsequent two lines affirm that by speaking 
of inherent dignity that flows between the self and the other.49  
                                                            
46 Ibid 96. 
47 Ibid 97. 
48 Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC), 1943-1945. 
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However, in Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI)’s letter from 
the office of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith entitled “Considerations 
Regarding Proposals To Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual 
Persons”, a slightly different vision of justice is laid out: 
Differentiating between persons or refusing social recognition or benefits is unacceptable 
only when it is contrary to justice. The denial of the social and legal status of marriage to 
forms of cohabitation that are not and cannot be marital is not opposed to justice; on the 
contrary, justice requires it.50 
 
I do not wish to exclusively focus on gay marriage or the legal parameters of it here, for 
the parameters of the livelihoods of LGBTQ Catholics both encompass and transcend that 
important discussion. However, it is worth highlighting Ratzinger’s vision of justice 
seems to include discrimination and subjugation of LGBTQ people (and not just 
Catholics, for this document discusses both church and civil marriage) by necessity in 
order to keep a just, orderly social framework from collapsing. 
Young offers a different vision of justice that embraces people in their 
idiosyncrasies and views them as relational beings whose lives, interests, and aims are 
irrevocably tied up in those of others. This speaks to the deeply communal notions of 
solidarity, sacrament, and a common good that threads throughout the universal Catholic 
Church; indeed, the church’s vision of social, environmental, and material justice finds a 
good deal of synchronicity with Young, if not the Church’s relative oppression of women 
and LGBTQ peoples, as explored in this thesis. Thus, it would seem that an approach to 
justice akin to Young would be helpful and consistent if applied to the areas where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
49 I suspect Young would find too much to disagree with in this articulation of justice, 
besides the Church’s lingering and embedded patriarchal language and structure, which is 
also a topic for an entire separate inquiry. 
50 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, “Considerations Regarding Proposals To Give Legal 
Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons,” Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith, section 8, 2003. 
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Church’s relational justice veers sharply away toward a colder, impartial, universal law 
that cleaves bodies and relationships: matters of sexuality, identity, and relationship. To 
get to the heart of the paradoxes, hypocrisies, and suffering faced by LGBTQ Catholics, 
it seems clear that the Catholic Church must assess its core definitions of justice and see 
where and how incongruences seep into rhetoric and practice.
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Chapter 2: Trauma and Oppression 
 
Just communities are comprised of people who are allowed to develop and live 
their identities free of oppression or attack. However, within communities all over the 
world, groups of people are routinely demoralized and disallowed from participating as 
full members of community life. In the Catholic world, many LGBTQ individuals walk a 
careful line. Some people are welcomed with open arms into parishes and educational 
communities; however, others experience, harassment, exclusion, and downright 
hostility. LGBTQ individuals across the spectrum undergo heightened harassment, from 
the roughly 80% of LGBTQ school children who experience bullying in a given school 
year to the fact that LGBTQ teens are eight times as likely to attempt suicide than their 
cisgender peers.51 It proves difficult to quantitatively wade through the Catholic world to 
pinpoint concrete numbers on harassment, bullying, and shunning; however, as shown in 
the last chapter, more and more autobiographical and secondary accounts are emerging of 
the pain, anger, and loneliness suffered by Catholics who have been told time and time 
again that their deepest selves are existential, sinful paradoxes. I wish to connect this pain 
to the growing literature and exploration of the nature and function of two distinct, yet 
related concepts: trauma and oppression. 
Trauma 
The American Psychological Association (APA) defines trauma as such: 
Trauma is an emotional response to a terrible event like an accident, rape, or natural 
disaster. Immediately after the event, shock and denial are typical. Longer-term reactions 
                                                            
51 “LGBT Bullying Statistics”, nobullying.com; “Statistics You Should Know About Gay 
and Transgender Students,” PFLAG New York.  
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include unpredictable emotions, flashbacks, strained relationships, and even physical 
symptoms like headaches and nausea.52 
 
While some LGBTQ Catholics experience identity-rooted physical assaults and violence, 
others do not. The language and narratives associated with the effects of trauma give ripe 
opportunity to explore how certain aspects of trauma might factor in the lives of LGBTQ 
Catholics.  
In the introduction to the interdisciplinary collection on trauma that she edited, 
Cathy Caruth offers that disciplines from across the academic spectrum are beginning to 
turn toward trauma to try and understand and hear “the radical disruptions and gaps of 
traumatic experience.”53 Attempting to understand traumatic experiences- the scarring 
events of life that sear and destroy any sense of normality, order, and justice- may seem a 
futile process in and of itself. However, an increasing number of researchers are 
exploring this tenuous space in the hopes of revealing something about how humans 
process trauma, damage, and healing in communities. It is particularly salient to examine 
trauma in community, because those who undergo it often- but not always- identify with 
some particular social group. 
 In much of the literature surrounding trauma, brushes with death are often the 
central catalysts that trigger debilitating consequences, ranging from what is called PTSD 
(post traumatic stress disorder) to other, more subtle symptoms that are difficult to 
classify and are debated across the field. In his 1994 work Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: 
Additional Perspectives, Merrill I. Lipton notes that the more commonly noted causes of 
obvious trauma- such as “physical or sexual abuse, auto accidents, war, rape, natural 
                                                            
52 “Trauma”, American Psychological Association. 
53 Cathy Caruth, “Trauma and Experience: Introduction,” Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, 4. 
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disasters like storms and earthquakes”- should not exclude “a wide diversity of traumas 
that are often overlooked.”54 Outside of readily recognized trauma-inducing experiences, 
indirect possible causes traumas are also known and explored by trauma theorists: direct 
witnessing of traumatic events, being in relationship with community members that have 
experienced trauma, and inner harm from rhetorical, emotional, and spiritual abuse, 
which I explore through the lives of LGBTQ Catholics. In trying to paint a picture of how 
traumatic experience unfolds, Caruth notes that 
The pathology consists, rather, solely in the structure of its experience or reception: the 
experience is not assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in its 
repeated possession of the one who experiences it. To be traumatized is to be possessed 
by an image or an event.55 
 
Some trauma scholars- such as Shoshana Felman- reflect on the role of witnessing in the 
traumatic experience, either by the person undergoing trauma, those explicitly or 
implicitly causing the trauma, or secondary and tertiary participants. In his work on 
trauma through the lens of historiography, Writing History, Writing Trauma, Frank 
LaCapra references Caruth’s evocation of “the voice of trauma emerging from the wound 
itself…a voice testifying to the role of victim as witness” as a stark image of who and 
what speaks when the seemingly impossible becomes real.  
There seem to be two lingering questions for anyone who tries to bring the 
language and literature of trauma into an exploration of the lives of LGBTQ Catholics. 
First, why use the framework of trauma for a kind of harm that is not necessarily material 
and are often inflicted subtly over time, given that by many definitions, it needs to be 
associated with death or disaster? Second, how do people who may not be direct victims 
                                                            
54 Merrill I. Lipton, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Additional Perspectives, ix. 
55 Caruth, 4-5. 
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of trauma help bring about processes of healing?  Third, if the evolving study of trauma is 
based on individual experience, how can it be connected to the larger social groups with 
which individuals identify?  
Witnessing 
 To begin, I submit that trauma may find its way into lives and psyches of 
secondary and tertiary observers more often than may be realized, especially in 
communities. In her contribution to the edited volume Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 
Shoshana Felman recounts her experiences and memories from the first iteration of a 
graduate class she led at Yale in 1984 entitled  ‘Literature and Testimony’. The chapter 
covers a great deal of ground; some of its earlier sections recount the implications that 
narrative, testimony, and witnessing can have on literature, poetry, and psychoanalysis 
through examining some of the works that the class covered, such as Dostoyevsky’s 
Notes from the Underground, the work and life of Paul Celan, and The Interpretation of 
Dreams by Sigmund Freud. I will focus, however, on what these sections build up to: 
Felman’s account of the class’s viewing of Holocaust narratives from the Fortunoff 
Video Archive56, and the subsequent ‘crisis’ that the class and its teacher- Felman- found 
themselves in. Her decision to have the class ‘move on…from poetry into reality…to 
study in a literary class something which is a priori not defined as literary, but is rather of 
the order of raw documents- historical and autobiographical’57 was intended to add a 
                                                            
56 According to its webpage, the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies is ‘a 
collection of over 4,400 videotaped interviews with witnesses and survivors of the 
Holocaust’ and is located in Yale University’s Sterling Memorial Library. For more 
information, see http://www.library.yale.edu/testimonies/. 
57 Felman 1995: 46. 
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visceral, more real dimension to the textual landscape the class had previously navigated; 
however, she did not expect the outcome this would have.  
 The first interview Felman focuses on are of a woman’s description of her 
relationship to her husband; they were married prior to the war and the Holocaust, and 
both were the only survivors from their families. In describing her choice to stay with her 
husband after the war despite their estrangement, she said that  
The man I married and the man he was after the war were not the same person. And I’m 
sure I was not the same person either…but somehow we had a need for each other 
because, he knew who I was, he was the only person who knew…He knew who I was, 
and I knew who he was…and we’re here, we’re here to tell you the story.58 
 
The multiple levels upon which testimony work make this account shocking and 
emotionally powerful; indeed, the major driving force behind the woman’s will to survive 
was so her story would exist beyond the confines of events that seemed impossible and 
ludicrous. This notion of the seeming non-reality of what Holocaust victims went through 
was voiced further by the second interviewee, a young boy who survived the Plashow 
camp and was eventually reunited with his parents that he missed desperately; after 
surviving the camp and re-joining his parents, however, he discovered that the 
“emaciated and disfigured”59 people he encountered did not match up at all with the 
identity and imagery he had given them in his head. The symptoms of his trauma started 
developing in the years after, and his account- given after initially declining to share his 
stories and testimony, raises haunting questions: 
                                                            
58 Quoted in Felman 1995: 46-47. This sounds reminiscent of related, yet different 
traumas that soldiers and participants in war go through; a common refrain one often 
upon returning home from war is that outsiders who were not there, did not witness and 
act in the depravities that war often entails cannot understand. Exploring this in depth is 
the work of a separate essay; however, one example from literature that shines a light on 
these themes that comes to mind is Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried. 
59 Felman 1995: 48. 
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It was always…something you have to forget…It just wasn’t there…For the past thirty 
five years I’ve been trying to convince myself that it never happened, that…maybe it 
happened, but I wasn’t affected. I walked under the rain without getting wet… 
We are what we are…we can change some, but we will never be able to eradicate…what 
happened…The big question is: Are we transferring our anxieties, our fears, our 
problems, to the generations to come? And this is why I feel we are talking here not only 
of the lost generation…this time we are dealing with lost generations. It’s not only us.60 
 
 Felman goes on to describe how the class, after having watched these interviews 
together in an apartment, went through a sort of crisis in the days and weeks following. 
They called Felman to discuss their feelings and talk through some of what was coursing 
through their minds and bodies; the friends of the students even reached out to Felman to 
report that the experience was the only thing they could seemingly talk about. After 
consulting with the Yale psychoanalyst who helped make the viewing possible, she 
addressed the students’ feelings of crisis and vulnerability head on and structured the 
remainder of the class around them. After working through their own emotions and 
thoughts individually and as a group, the final reflections that the class turned into 
Felman were “amazingly articulate, reflective, and profound statement[s] of the trauma 
they had gone through and of the significance of their assuming the position of the 
witness.”61 Felman had created an environment and shared in a very personal experience 
in which they crossed some plane of knowing, learning, understanding, and witnessing 
that academic work normally entails. In coming exhaustively close to the testimony, 
storytelling, and broken and forming narrative identities of the survivors, and after having 
immersed themselves in the written, fictional worlds of these same realities in the prior 
months, it seems that the students entered a new zone of vulnerability where the stories 
and identity of all the people involved, past and present, collided. 
                                                            
60 Quoted in Felman 1995: 48-49. Italics are interviewee’s emphasis, not my own. 
61 Felman 1995: 55. 
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In reflecting on Felman’s conclusions, there is a legitimate question as to whether 
current understandings of narrative identity adequately allow for the debilitating effects 
of trauma. I will quote Felman in full because it gives the proper scope of what she is 
trying to convey to the reader: 
I would venture to propose…that teaching in itself, teaching as such, takes place 
precisely only through a crisis: if teaching does not hit upon some sort of crisis, if it does 
not encounter either the vulnerability or the explosiveness of an (explicit or implicit) 
critical and unpredictable dimension, it has perhaps not truly taught; it has perhaps passed 
on facts, passed on some information and some documents, with which the students or 
the audience- the recipients- can for instance do what people during the occurrence of the 
Holocaust precisely did with information that kept coming forth but that no one could 
recognize, and that no one could therefore truly learn, read, or put to use.62 
 
Felman is saying that the very nature of pedagogy transforms- or perhaps is revealed- 
when immersed in crises studies and- in her experience- of the subsequent crises of those 
studying and teaching them. It makes sense that these thoughts might come out of 
studying and working with those who have undergone trauma, in fiction and real life. 
However, it seems that classes and experiences like the one Felman describes could have 
transformative and even ultimately positive effects in other disciplines; that will have to 
be explored elsewhere. I will return to these questions around identity and witnessing in 
relation to Felman in the next chapter. 
Death, Trauma, and Identity 
In reflecting on the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster, Robert Jay Lifton discusses 
“death equivalents” that induce rifts and cracks in the ties that bind people together 
through geography, identity, and comfort when scarring experiences bring about a brush 
                                                            
62 Felman 1995: 55. 
P a g e  | 31 
 
with death and all it represents.63 These “images of separation, disintegration, and 
stasis…serve as psychic precursors” for death.64 Upon reading the testimonies of people 
whose lives were torn asunder by the disaster, Lifton begins to note some of the 
hallmarks of trauma magnified on a social scale that encompass individual feelings of 
“psychic numbing”, an “unfocused rage” in relationships and toward others, and a 
perpetual dwelling on the hand of God or other divine movements in effectively 
destroying all that was known and familiar.65 Death narrowly came to many in Buffalo 
Creek (indeed, one hundred twenty five of the 5,000 members of the community were 
killed) and the entire community was thrust into a constant survival mode. However, 
Lifton notes that focusing on survival when engaging with traumatized persons “suggests 
that there has been death, and the survivor has therefore had a death encounter, and the 
death encounter is central to his or her psychological experience.”66 These death 
equivalents deserve further study in light of the experiences of LGBTQ Catholics, for it is 
the likely case that many people find themselves living some of the classic symptoms of 
trauma without going through an obvious death experience or death equivalent. What to 
make of this? I suggest that there may be room for definitions around traumatic impetus 
and symptoms to expand to the non-physical and immediate to attempt to encapsulate 
some of what we’re seeing. 
The Buffalo Creek flood and destruction also speaks to the feeling that groups of 
people- and entire communities- seem to experience some sort of social trauma. For 
                                                            
63 See Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Olson, “The Human Meaning of Total Disaster,” as 
well as Cathy Caruth’s interview with Lifton for the edited volume Trauma: Explorations 
in Memory. 
64 Vincent E. Harry, Death Work: Police, Trauma, and the Psychology of Survival, 52. 
65 Ibid, 212-217. 
66 Lifton (interview), in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 128-129. 
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many years, Lifton, Kai Erikson, and others have gotten to know the individuals and 
families whose lives were devastated by a flood due to human error and negligence by 
the Pittson Coal Company. Almost immediately, the cracks in the social fabric revealed 
themselves and got worse with time. As Erikson puts it in Everything In Its Path: 
The worst damage, though, was done to the minds and spirits of the people who survived 
the disaster, and it is there that one must begin the search for scars…It was as if every 
man, woman, and child in the place- every one- was suffering from some combination of 
anxiety, depression, insomnia, apathy, or simple “bad nerves”, and to make matters 
worse, those complaints were expressed in such similar ways that they almost sounded 
rehearsed.67 
 
Erikson goes on to distinguish between individual trauma that acts as a “blow to the 
psyche” from some brush with death that induces individuals to “withdraw into 
themselves, feeling numbed, afraid, vulnerable, and very alone.”68 This trauma is 
connected to a larger, relational phenomenon that he calls collective trauma: 
By collective trauma…I mean a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the 
bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality. The 
collective trauma works its way slowly and even insidiously into the awareness of those 
who suffer from it, so it does not have the quality of suddenness normally associated with 
“trauma.” But it is a form of shock all the same, a gradual realization that the community 
no longer exists as an effective form of support and that an important part of the self has 
disappeared. As people begin to emerge hesitantly from the protective shells into which 
they have withdrawn, they learn that they are isolated and alone, wholly dependent upon 
their own individual resources. “I” continues to exist, though damaged and maybe even 
permanently changed. “You” continues to exist, although distant and hard to relate to. 
But “we” no longer exist as a connected pair or as linked cells in a larger communal 
body.69 
 
These definitions- particularly collective trauma- are remarkable for their resonance with 
the self-narration of the lives of LGBTQ Catholics in the community of the Church, for 
so many of its call signs- the insidiousness and the damaged bonds without the necessity 
for suddenness, and the damaged and altered self that seems severed from the warmth 
                                                            
67 Kai Erikson, Everything In Its Path, 135-136. 
68 Ibid 154. 
69 Ibid 154. 
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and structure of the community- speaks to the autobiographical accounts and stories of 
LGBTQ Catholics from the previous chapter. Additionally, it speaks to the fact that the 
majority, empowered population within the Church community- heterosexual, cisgender 
individuals- could possibly be drawn into and be affected by this version of trauma as 
well, even if they do not directly perpetrate it and negatively impact the lives of their 
LGBTQ brethren. I will return to this notion toward the end of the thesis. 
 Throughout Erikson’s work, he references the interviews and autobiographical 
accounts of the people of Buffalo Creek in describing their past and current experiences, 
thoughts, and feelings. Here are the thoughts of one man reflecting on the role of the 
Pittston Coal Company in the disaster that upended his community’s life: 
I have a deep-seated resentment against Pittston, which probably isn’t normal, but I just 
cannot help it. I resent the fact that no one even bothered to come to see if we were well, 
needed anything, offer to help clean up, or seem to care what happened to us. This is 
probably the wrong way to feel, but I just cannot help it.70 
 
As Erikson notes, this man seems almost apologetic for his anger and seems perplexed 
and distraught at the company’s abandonment. He calls this a sort of  “paternal 
relationship with the people of (Buffalo Creek)” that has been ruptured by a seeming lack 
of care or concern. Later on, in the section on collective trauma, Erikson muses on the 
ways in which individual desires, dreams, frustrations, and spirits are tied up in 
transcendental visions of community. These “bear at least a figurative resemblance to an 
organism…it is the community that cushions pain, the community that provides a context 
for intimacy, the community that represents morality and serves as the repository for old 
traditions.”71 Parishes, schools, and Catholic institutional communities from around the 
                                                            
70 Ibid 182. 
71 Ibid 193-194. 
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world would instantly feel at home with this imagery and language; indeed, Catholics 
consider themselves to be united and wrapped up in the Body of Christ. If that 
community seemingly turns on a person, either aggressively attacking or implicitly 
abandoning him or her- not even “being bothered to see if (one) was well”- what does 
that do to the psyche? 
These and other writers- from Caruth to Lifton to Freud- all approach trauma 
from different angles and disciplinary flourishes; however, almost all of them directly or 
obliquely mention some of the reoccurring hallmarks of traumatic experience: distorted 
and broken relationship, “imagery, symbolization, and meaning”, and a sense of dire 
helplessness to sift through what is supposed to be right and truthful in the world. All of 
these mirror some of the hallmarks of the psychological, emotional, and spiritual angst 
undergone by LGBTQ Catholics who have experienced a range of negativity in their 
respective communities as they came more fully into their own identity, whether it be 
outright hostility, suspicion, or verbal & physical abuse. I hesitate in making full claims 
of trauma in tenuous territory from the standpoint of an observer; however, it seems ever 
more apparent that the language, metaphors, and narrative vehicles LGBTQ Catholics 
have variously employed to describe their experiences live comfortably within the sphere 
of a sort of communal, identity-based trauma.  
Susan Brison’s Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self, a narrative 
account and work of philosophy pieced together in the years after her brutal assault and 
near murder in the countryside of France, offers this thought about the messy intersection 
of identity and trauma: 
If we are socially constructed, as I believe we are, in large part through our group-based 
narratives, the self is not a single, coherent, unified entity. Its structure is more chaotic, 
with harmonious and contradictory aspects, like the particles of an atom, attracting and 
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repelling each other, hanging together in a whirling, ever-changing dance that any 
attempt at observation- or narration- alters.72 
 
The act of articulating personal trauma and tying it to others is difficult, as Brison 
acknowledges earlier, because one runs the risk of speaking for others, among other 
things.73 Brison has a particular vantage point as a woman, a professional philosopher, a 
rape survivor, and other identities, and any attempt to equivocate her clear experience of 
trauma with the continual degradation of identity that many LGBTQ Catholics go 
through would be problematic. However, comparisons of the peculiarities and rupture of 
traumatic experience are necessary to attempt to glean whether the LGBTQ Catholic 
experience might contain components of trauma itself, even outside of a singular physical 
event. 
Oppression and the Church 
In perhaps an even more acute fashion, the language of oppression captures the 
mental and psychological anguish amongst persons and groups that have been subjugated 
within larger populations and communities. In her book Analyzing Oppression, Ann E. 
Cudd presents her take on social groups and argues that  
 
…It is individuals who suffer the injustices of oppression, though they can do so only as 
members of social groups. It is because humans sort themselves into social groups and 
find it nearly impossible as well as undesirable to extract themselves from social groups 
that they can oppress each other.74 
 
Cudd is careful to parse out the different forms of oppression; in doing so, she lends a 
careful hand to an attempt to determine the state of play for the broader LGBTQ Catholic 
community. Cudd defines subjective oppression as the notion or feeling that one is 
                                                            
72 Susan Brison, Aftermath, 95. 
73 Ibid 94. 
74 Ann E. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 23. 
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oppressed, whereas “objective oppression (is) the fact of oppression.”75 Correspondingly, 
distinctions must be made between psychological oppression that deals with oppression 
through affecting inner states, moods, and feelings- a sort of “psychic harm”- and 
material oppression that lives within tangible physical harm to self or resources. All of 
these forms of oppression intertwine and play off one another, Cudd argues; in the end, 
they fuse into one “univocal concept” of oppression that spreads exponentially in 
damaging lives and groups of people in similar ways, whether they be oppressed 
“women…blacks…Jews…or homosexuals.”76 In attempting to apply some or all of these 
forms of oppression to the lived experiences of LGBTQ Catholics, I tread carefully; 
however, as Cudd and others cite, LGBTQ individuals have been one of the hallmark 
oppressed groups of individuals in recent times. Such oppression within a broader faith 
community such as the Catholic Church is particularly insidious and troubling because of 
the mixed, often negative messaging that permeates the teaching, rhetoric, outreach, and 
actions of some Church leaders and ordinary lay members toward their LGBTQ 
community members. Some examples include use of language like “intrinsically 
disordered” and the oft-quoted notion appropriated from St. Augustine of loving 
individuals but hating their sin, with sin referencing homosexuality and/or homosexual 
acts.77 
 Cudd explores possible origins of the psychological mechanisms and factors that 
fuel oppression. Two particularly salient sources for her are Franz Fanon and Cynthia 
Willett, who both underscore the need for recognition amidst violence in similar, yet 
                                                            
75 Ibid 24. 
76 Ibid 24. 
77 CCC 2357. 
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distinct ways. In Fanon’s view, oppression destroys and obfuscates the recognition 
necessary to live a live full of dignity and have a healthy sense of identity.78 Groups 
develop superiority and inferiority complexes between the recognizers and the recognized 
in a social ecosystem, and oppression functions as various forms of violence. This 
violence answered with a form of counter-violence that “chases away the colonial rulers 
and makes the oppressed people and organized people” that can self-achieve freedom.79 
Willett cites Hegel to a greater extent than Fanon; however, although she defines freedom 
differently than Hegel’s “masculinized” version. She too recognizes recognition as the 
possible crux of freedom that defies slavery and oppression; however, this lies in her 
definition of the self as embodied and socially connected “in the caress” that makes 
human relationship and awareness of the tactile other as the foundation for the ethical 
foundation of humanity.80 Cudd does not fully assert that Willett or anyone else 
articulates a complete psychological foundation that anchors an overarching theory of 
oppression; indeed, such universalizing efforts might be problematic in and of themselves 
because they push the histories and harmful experiences of oppressed peoples to the side 
of the shelf.81 
 The other crucial part of the psychological basis for oppression is the pervasive, 
debilitating effects of stereotypes. She defines stereotypes as the “generalizations that we 
make about persons based on characteristics that we believe they share with some 
identifiable group.”82 Indeed, Cudd points out that the popular way in which cognitive 
                                                            
78 Ibid 62. 
79 Ibid 62-63. 
80 Ibid 66. 
81 Ibid 77-78. 
82 Ibid 69. 
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psychologists define stereotypical thinking as a form of categorizing may be morally 
wrong, even if it is common practice for human beings. In groups and out-groups are 
formed within larger communities, and individuals are driven to cultivate and protect a 
positive presence within the in-group for healthy self-identification. Cudd argues early on 
that oppressed groups almost necessarily need oppressor groups, even if all the 
individuals within that group do not intend to oppress or even are aware that they are 
doing so. For that to happen, out-groups that are denigrated and excluded must exist.83 
When all of these factors combine, a thriving oppression emerges that promotes some and 
distorts others; the community may survive and seem viable on the surface, but acute 
pain and a lack of recognition flourish underneath. Those oppressed may feel angry, 
alienated, harmed, and abandoned; yet, many are psychologically co-opted into believing 
in what others have deemed them to be. Cudd summarizes this entire process neatly: 
Oppressed persons often acquiesce to and accept their own oppression because thy come 
to believe in the stereotypes that represent their own inferiority, are weakened by those 
stereotypes and even motivated to fulfill them.84 
  
When these various characteristics of oppression are lent to an examination of 
LGBTQ Catholics within the church communities, warning signs arise immediately. 
They are second hand citizens to begin with, caught in a divide of identity and practice; 
their embodied selves through sexual, loving relationships are demarcated as grave error, 
sinful, and morally bereft of goodness. However, the language of inherent dignity 
embedded in the Catechism, the words of bishops, and other parishioners keeps many 
within the community. Indeed, the stereotypes of how gay and lesbian people function 
and how they are meant to exist in this world seem to have permeated the psyche of many 
                                                            
83 Ibid 25 and 78. 
84 Ibid 80. 
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Catholics, both straight or LGBTQ, oppressor and oppressed. The Letter on the Pastoral 
Care of Homosexual Persons defines homosexual acts as “essentially self-indulgent” and 
“contrary to the creative wisdom of God.”85 In response, researchers and authors have 
begun to look elsewhere for understanding on these topics, most notably to LGBTQ 
Catholics themselves. As a bridge to Chapter 3 and how trauma and oppression might 
debilitate identity, I turn to the work of Andrew Yip. He surveyed over one hundred gay 
and lesbian Catholics in the United Kingdom about Church teaching on homosexuality, 
relationships, and love, and a variety of responses and attitudes toward their own places 
within the community were given.  
A few that capture the different reactions- from incredulousness and anger to 
acceptance and a curious adaptation- are seen below: 
The expression of love cannot be wrong. Why would God give the desire without 
allowing fulfillment? I know that I was born gay, so how can the expression of what my 
nature is be sinful? 
Respondent 119 
 
This individual addresses arguments from natural law at their root by affirming his 
identity as part of his created self, and expression of that identity as logically consistent 
with the theological notions of God’s perfection in creation. 
God created us in his own image- homosexual. He doesn’t make mistakes. Our essential 
Christian vocation is the same as everyone else’s: to receive love and to give love. Most 
human beings are clearly called to a loving, sexual, one-to-one relationship with another. 
We are, too. It is our duty to fulfill our vocation to give love and receive love in stable 
relationships. The Church is quite wrong in what it says about this, and doing severe 
damage to the Body of Christ. 
 
Respondent 121, his emphasis 
 
                                                            
85 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Letter on the Pastoral Care of Homosexuals, Congregation 
of the Doctrine of the Faith, paragraph 7, 1984. 
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This person goes even further in stating the logical incoherency of the Church’s teachings 
on love and homosexuality, respectively; his emphasis of the word “duty” stands in 
contrast to Cardinal Ratzinger’s assertion that “justice requires” the opposition and 
outlaw of same-sex unions earlier in Chapter 1. Respondent 121’s diction at the end of 
his testimony about damage done to the “Body of Christ” adds another layer of 
inextricability between the relationships between members of the Church and the 
theological and metaphysical implications of love for Catholics. Unlike the first two, 
Respondent 57 had a different take on his status in the Church and in the eyes of God: 
Sodomy is condemned, not only by the Church, but by God in the Bible- the ultimate 
guide to living! However, I am quite sure that two men really loving one another, even to 
masturbation (mutual) but without sodomy, is quite acceptable to God. Sodomy is an 
abomination in God’s sight. The term ‘making love’ so often means anything but that, but 
simply giving way to lust and sinful, selfish gratification of one’s sexual lust. 
 
Respondent 57, his emphasis86 
 
This man has seemingly fully embraced his own second-class status because of Church 
teaching and biblical tradition, yet fully embraces love within God’s eyes so long as it is 
divorced from the act of physical love. As I have recurrently said throughout, it would be 
presumptuous and ill considered to speculate on the inner motivations of LGBTQ 
Catholics from a removed, secondary observer; however, this person’s words echo some 
of the acceptance of subjugation through stereotypes and moral certainty of the majority 
discussed in Cudd’s work, even though he still sees and seeks a path to a form of love 
alongside those in his Church who see him as distinct and damaged. 
 To return to Cudd- what are some of the harms of this oppression, particularly in 
cases when notions of God, divine order, and moral fates are brought into the picture? In 
                                                            
86 Andrew K.T. Yip, “Dare to Differ: Gay and Lesbian Catholics’ Assessment of Official 
Catholic Positions on Sexuality”, 1997, 172-175. 
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her sixth chapter, she notes that oppression is linked and rooted in a language of trauma 
that has three consequences: terror and psychological violence, humiliation and 
degradation, and objectification.87 There are also three indirect psychological forces at 
play: shame and low-self esteem, false consciousness, and deformed desires.88 Although 
all do not apply in all cases and in all times for examining the varied experiences of 
LGBTQ Catholics in the Church, I argue that there is a great deal of evidence that the 
language of oppression and trauma whirl around in vicious cycle that has broken and 
altered the spirits, psyches, and relational senses of many within the Church, whether in 
direct or secondary fashions. In a spiritual sense, she says “trauma severely disrupts 
human relationships and the trust that victims have in other people and the divine.”89 
These accounts and surveys speak to a shattered trust in both God and other people, 
which I will explore further in the next chapter.
                                                            
87 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 160-163. 
88 Ibid 176. 
89 Ibid 160. 
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Chapter 3: Fragmented Identities 
 
Having established both that communities must cultivate a concept of justice that 
affirms identity and that trauma and oppression can debilitate the lives and psyches of 
individuals, social groups, and the social ties that bind people together in community, we 
must now turn to the question identity itself. Philosophers have long explored the nature 
and function of personal identity, and most debate centers on whether identity is fixed, 
malleable, or something in between, and what factors- memory, experience, social 
circumstance, and so on- shape it.90 In recent years, scholars from multiple disciplines 
(including philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and literary theory) have 
increasingly explored identity through the lens of narrative. Narrative identity treats 
humans as beings driven stories, and involves the process “by which people convey to 
themselves and others who they are, how they came to be, and where they think their 
lives may be going in the future.”91 For many narrative advocates, such as Paul Ricœur, a 
French philosopher well known as a hermeneutic phenomenologist who studied narrative, 
identity is inextricably tied up with ethical action and a search for rightness and meaning 
within communities of layered, complex relationships. In Narrative and Time, Ricœur 
attempts to solve the paradox of the fixed self and the changing self by arguing, as 
Patrick Crowley summarizes, that “narrative…mediates the aporia of change and 
                                                            
90 For a broader overview of the philosophy of identity, see Harold Noonan and Ben 
Curtis’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, last updated in 2014. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/#5 
91 McAdams and McLean 2013: 233. 
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permanence through a process of ‘emplotment’ that organizes the contingencies of 
existence into a coherent whole.”92  
Assuming that human beings attempt to mentally, emotionally, physically, and 
spiritually organize their lives into a “coherent whole”, I will explore narrative identity as 
it relates to ethical decision-making and community life. Afterward, I will explore 
autobiographical accounts of how LGBTQ Catholics variously describe their experience 
of narrative identity in the Church as a sort of identity-based bifurcation and “forced 
schizophrenia” as related to their sexual identities, their relationships, their membership 
in Catholic communities, and their deep senses of selves and connections to God.93 Given 
this reality, I will suggest that the Church recognize and admit the powerful damage that 
its rhetoric and rulings inflicts on its LGBTQ members and claim that it cannot purport to 
be an universal community centered around justice whilst simultaneously debilitating and 
splintering the identities and lives of some of its members. There seems to be sufficient 
evidence to classify this damage as deep-seated trauma on a similar level as other trauma 
discussed in psychological and medical literature, which would have grave implications 
on the legitimacy of the Catholic Church to claims of justice and would seem to require 
reconfigured theology and rhetoric around homosexuality and love in order to take steps 
toward reconciliation.  
Narrative Identity and Ethical Choice 
Narrative identity is committed to the notion that our experiences shape our 
perceptions of ourselves and the broader meanings of life. We experience life’s moments 
                                                            
92 Patrick Crowley, “Paul Ricœur: the Concept of Narrative Identity, the Trace of 
Autobiography”, 2. 
93 Dugan McGinley, Acts of Faith, Acts of Love: Gay Catholic Autobiographies as 
Sacred Texts, 12-13.  
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in the present; in every following second, minute, hour, and year, we re-visit them and 
shape them through the lens of narrative. Ricœur separates our identities into two parts, 
idem and ipse; whereas idem represents the fixed part of “I” that remains, ipse- or 
“Selfhood”- “…is analogous to narrative identity and involves the telling and retelling of 
a life-story, whether factual or fictional, such that the figure of identity that emerges 
offers a new insight into the self.”94 There is some part of us that constantly scours and 
re-interprets the past even as we move through the present. Indeed, the study of memory 
is intimately linked to how we self-conceive narratively. W. David Booth points to 
cultural markers like family photo albums as sorts of memory- and, thus, identity- 
shapers. A near-universal object like the photo album has a powerful hold on people. 
Beyond the laughter, tears, and sentimentality it can cause in its observers as they fondly 
(or hesitantly) recall past events and people, photo albums have immediate impact on our 
present and future self-conception. For Booth, the photo album 
shows memory in its fragile, vulnerable attempt to gather in and guard the past, lest it be 
lost to the passage of time and to forgetting. And it casts some light on ways in which 
what is remembered and forgotten are shaped by power, interest and selection.95 
 
When memory is tied in, Booth finds kinship with Iris Marion Young and, to some 
extent, Kwame Anthony Appiah by saying that “identity and difference/differentiation 
are two sides of the same coin.”96 As discussed in Chapter 1, Young argues that it is 
impossible to separate people from the differences and social markers that make them up; 
this seems congruent with the notion that we cannot distance ourselves from the 
narratives that encircle our lives, whether told to us or told by us.   
                                                            
94 Crowley 2-3. 
95 W. David Booth, “The Work of Memory: Time, Identity, and Justice”, 243. 
96 Ibid 255. 
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The vehicle for sharing identities is the story. Stories cannot exist in vacuums, 
because their meaning comes out in their sharing. Sharing is often verbal and, more 
broadly, linguistic in nature; therefore, much of the discourse around narrative identity 
has come through analyzing the positive effects that things like the ‘power of 
conversation’ have on human beings through adolescence, their formative young adult 
years, and beyond, as found in the work of Jack McAdams and others. I affirm that the 
broad study of narrative identity can be extraordinarily powerful in theory and practice; 
however, it is clear that it is limited by what it leaves out of its own definition. Emotional 
and non-linguistic bodily experiences seem to contribute just as much to lifelong, 
evolving notions of the self and identity, especially when considering communities of 
people- such as LGBTQ Catholics- who have undergone repeated attempts by outside 
forces to strip physicality away from them. Much of the discourse has not made those 
experiences crucial to narrative identity. 
Although the theoretical discourse around narrative identity is strong, it has 
troubling gaps and voids when it comes to integrating emotional and non-linguistic 
experiences into its conception of how identity is shaped and formed over time.97 This 
observation comes into sharper focus when analyzed in light of trauma. Traumatic 
experiences- or, as Caruth and others might describe them, ‘non-experience[s]’- often 
shape the very foundations of the identities and personal narratives of the affected. 
Trauma has and continues to be defined in many ways, which I take as a good sign; the 
fluidity, uncertainty, and fragility embedded in the effort to study trauma academically 
calls for such an interdisciplinary, evolving definition. However, Cathy Caruth’s 
                                                            
97 I explored this in greater detail in my previous essay on narrative identity. 
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observation in her introduction to Trauma: Explorations in Memory that ‘to be 
traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image or an event’98 proves both effective 
for this essay and haunting in its implications.  
 In defining narrative identity and relating it to redemption, Dan McAdams and 
Kate McLean observe that ‘narrators who find redemptive meanings in suffering and 
adversity…tend to enjoy higher levels of mental health, well-being, and maturity.’99 This 
is entirely plausible and a desirable outcome for both those who have gone through 
suffering and adversity and humanity in general. However, the scale100 on which 
adversity and suffering can be measured is extremely broad, and there seems to be a 
marked, if difficult to identify difference between someone recounting a lost job and 
hearing a Holocaust survivor attempting to narrate the vicious brutalities and 
dehumanizing events of concentration camps. I am not suggesting that the experiences of 
those who have faced a sort of ‘smaller’ adversity are lesser or invalid; on the contrary, I 
simply mean that the very process of storytelling, narration, and lived experience might 
be different in ways for trauma victims, and we must recognize that.  
Debilitating influences such as trauma, oppression, and violence can emotionally 
and psychologically debilitate separate members of the community, not just those directly 
victimized; I will cover this more extensively in the next chapter. In light of Cathy Caruth 
and others’ discussions of the devastating impact trauma can have on individuals and 
communities, it is clear that those who are working with narratives in interdisciplinary 
ways must confront the reality that victims of trauma do not- and, perhaps, cannot- 
                                                            
98 Caruth 1995: 5. 
99 McAdams and McLean 2013: 233. 
100 I mean ‘scale’ metaphorically; although it’s likely that such a scale/scales exists, I am 
not referencing them.  
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approach or tell their own stories in the same ways others can. The formation of a 
positive, healthy narrative identity is possible despite- and, as McAdams, McLean, and 
others might suggest, because of- adversity and negative life experiences; however, the 
very definition of narrative identity must evolve and expand to acknowledge the fact that 
the telling and listening that lie at its heart may often seem ‘impossible’ for survivors of 
trauma. To this end, we would do well to dive into the lives and words of LGBTQ 
Catholics themselves, and reflect on narration and trauma through the work of Dugan 
McGinley. 
Narrating Gay Catholicism 
In his 2006 work Acts of Faith, Acts of Love, Dugan McGinley explores the 
tensions inherent in the identities and lives of LBGTQ Catholics in America and the 
possibilities offered by autobiographical self-narrative. McGinley situates his work 
amidst the small but growing body of critical literature examining the Church’s official 
teaching around homosexuality, the broader LGBTQ community, marriage, and full 
participation in the Church.101 McGinley admits his own limitations in his book: he 
addresses only the stories and autobiographical work of gay Catholic men in recent 
decades and does not attempt to speak to the complex problems of lesbian Catholic 
women or fuller LGBTQ community. Nonetheless, he hopes that the “liberatory 
principles of his analysis” can be used more broadly in the Church, especially given “the 
conflation of gay men and lesbians in official documents.”102 By utilizing autobiography, 
McGinley shows a “self in context” that stands in rich contrast the isolated way in which 
                                                            
101 Dugan McGinley, Acts of Faith, 2, 
102 I would add that the B, T, and Q of LGBTQ are also often conflated in Church 
documents and rhetoric- and, often, not well articulated or understood. 
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the church talks about sexuality.103 He briefly discusses the work of James Olney and 
other autobiographical theorists in identifying the “complex interplay between the autos 
(self) and the bios (life), constantly articulating and re-articulating a “textual self” over 
the course of a lifetime. In the contexts of sexuality and Catholicism, the 
autobiographical account stands on its own as a truthful, authentic counterpoint to official 
teaching that has not taken the first-person vantage point into consideration for 
centuries.104 
By embracing storytelling and autobiographical telling, the broader LGBTQ 
population both co-creating and revealing an integrated community that is part of many 
other previously established communities. Autobiography brings this reality into focus by 
transforming it into testimony and rendering “in a particularly direct and faithful way the 
experience and vision of a people.”105 LGBTQ Catholics who actively live their identity 
have been denied a voice in articulating their lives within official Church circles and 
reflecting on and disseminating Church teaching; thus, it seems that this sort of 
storytelling is a method for taking matters into their own hands to reveal truth. As 
McGinley puts it, 
Although the majority of the autobiographers I examine in this study are not aware o the 
many theoretical concerns relating to this genre, they do have a sense that telling one’s 
life story is vital to becoming a self and finding one’s voice. In doing so, they challenge 
those who would marginalize them, and they do justice work for the entire 
community…they perform a service by bringing flesh and blood to church teaching that 
effectively disembodies them, and by giving life to otherwise theoretical moral 
arguments.106 
 
                                                            
103 McGinley 37. 
104 Ibid 41-42. 
105 James Olney, “Autobiography and the Cultural Moment”, 13, qtd. In McGinley 45. 
106 McGinley 46. 
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These narrative searches for identity and self-knowledge differ in style and content, but 
many point to a similar desire for “places we visit…(and) places we can’t go…and a 
longing so real it becomes a place, an identity, a home” within the complex, interlocking 
experiences that make up this community that centers around sexual identities that have 
been rejected and cast aside by powerful social structures, including the Catholic 
Church.107 
 Within these autobiographical accounts, common themes emerge: emotional, 
psychological, and spiritual angst, depression, isolation, anger, and numbness. I will 
provide a small sample of some of these accounts to allow the words of gay Catholic 
individuals to speak for themselves, and to provide a connection to claims of inflicted 
trauma and oppression in the following chapter. I begin with the words of an Italian 
American gay Catholic who remembered his childhood isolation in his “Memoirs of a 
South Philly Sissy”: 
If there was one word to describe my childhood, it is “lonely.” An overwhelming, 
unbearable loneliness. Loneliness walked through my days, became my nightmares. I 
remember Christmas days when I sat alone near the tree in the living room, looking into a 
room full of relatives and family friends, feeling left out and thinking how unwelcome I’d 
be if they knew I was queer.108 
 
Note how he frames his loneliness as absolute, constant, and  “overwhelming”; even 
amidst family circumstances and a religious holiday that is supposed to be joyful in the 
Christian and Catholic tradition, Christmas, he feels afraid and separate from the rest of 
his loved ones by his very nature. This echoes Caruth’s definition of trauma as rupturing 
daily experience and turning it into “non-experience”.109 Although Mecca and the other 
witnesses cited in McGinley said that they knew their identity was innate from childhood, 
                                                            
107 Rob Nixon, “Avondale: A Memoir of Identity,” 42, qtd. in McGinley 51. 
108 Tommi Avicolli Mecca, “Memoirs of a South Philly Sissy,” 18, qtd. in Ibid 52. 
109 Caruth 4-5. 
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they came into fuller awareness of that truth at different times in their young lives; as 
Frank DeCaro put it, “I was born gay. It just took me sixteen years to figure it out.”110  
Despite this shared sense of some innate knowledge of their rightful identity, 
many of the autobiographical accounts spoke about how almost everything in their 
immediate surroundings and community structures forced them to bifurcate their lives 
into different spheres. The words of Richard Rodriguez are telling: 
For I knew nothing in the world was so dangerous as love, my kind of love…from an 
early age I needed to learn caution, to avert my eyes, to guard my speech, to separate 
myself from myself…Or to reconstruct myself in some eccentric way…My eyes looking 
one way, my soul another. My motive could not be integrated with my body, with act or 
response, or, indeed, approval.111 
 
The implications of some of the phrases Rodriguez uses, such as separation and 
reconstruction of the self and the impossibility of integrating “motive…and body,” are 
profound. This sort of internal splintering intuitively seems psychologically and 
emotionally damaging. It is difficult to measure how that damage compounds and shifts 
when tied to spiritual health. This splintering carried on into adolescence and young 
adulthood for many of the men cited by McGinley. They began to hear more and more 
derogatory and inflammatory language and rhetoric from their peers, families, and 
community members about LGBTQ people, such as “queer” and “faggot”, which created 
a “climate of fear” that sowed a deep resistance in the men to articulate and take 
ownership of their sexual identity.112 
 This climate can create a deep sense of self-loathing and shame, and as Fenton 
Johnson shares, can destroy one’s sense of being able to experience love in a healthy 
manner: 
                                                            
110 Frank DeCaro, “A Boy Named Phyllis: A Suburban Memoir”, qtd. in McGinley 53. 
111 Richard Rodriguez, “Brown”, 206, qtd. in McGinley 54. 
112 McGinley 57. 
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I had so deeply and profoundly accepted this given that I had no awareness of my own 
self-contempt…I had never heard words to describe the desires that of their own accord 
visited me. A man loving a man- I had never read of this or seen images of it; I had never 
experienced it in any way other than the recesses of my own desire, a place so ugly (I 
assumed) it was beyond the pale of words. To defend myself against my desire I 
constructed an elaborate wall around my heart, so high no one could see in and I could 
not see out.113 
 
These perceptions of self ebb and flow over time with each individual, and some Catholic 
stories are brighter than others, as McGinley notes, depending on the particular responses 
and experiences of affirmation from family, community members, and Church figures. 
However, the lingering negativity still taints much of the experience of Catholic life for 
LGBTQ individuals. The language embedded throughout these accounts that conjures 
imagery of blocking others out, feeling helpless and angry, and not being able to escape 
perceptions of despair for barely a moment all resonate with traumatic language and, in a 
different sense, narratives of the oppressed. These recent autobiographical efforts 
documented by McGinley and others show how the Church must recognize this reality 
for these voices all tell of “how being gay is deeply embedded in sense of self...the 
church would like to separate being gay from doing gay, but it is not that simple”114 If the 
Catholic community truly wishes to treat all its members with dignity and justice in the 
image and likeness of God, it might look in reconciliation to the words of LGBTQ 
Catholics like Andrew Holleran, who identifies sexual identity as “the thing around 
which our deepest wishes coalesce: the desire for love, trust, fidelity, stability, a home, a 
companion, a future, all of that.”115 
                                                            
113 Fenton Johnson, Geography, 73, qtd in McGinley 58. 
114 McGinley 82. 
115 Andrew Holleran, American Contradictions: Interviews with Nine American Writers, 
qtd. in McGinley 82. 
P a g e  | 52 
 
What light can be shed on the process of identity from these explorations of 
trauma, oppression, and autobiographical telling? It is clear that trauma, as defined by 
processes of storytelling and accounts, affects multiple levels of a community from direct 
participant to secondary and tertiary observers. That narrative process of discovering and 
articulating identity seems to have been negatively warped for all involved. In Felman’s 
work, the pain, confusion, and denial of the Holocaust survivors of their own lived 
realities comes through in the tension between their urges to repress their experiences- 
turn them into ‘non experiences’- and their need to bear witness to themselves and others, 
to, as the second survivor phrases it, “deal with our feelings, understand our 
experience[s].”116 This does not mean that the ability to form positive narrative identity is 
totally broken. In both the deeper way that the witnesses’ accounts were ‘freeing’117 and 
in the relief, growth, and discovery that came from the students’ initial trauma as 
witnesses to raw testimony, it seems that both parties’ narrative selves survived to the 
other side, as it were. 
The earlier definition of narrative identity as overcoming adversity and “finding 
redemption” seems inadequate and out of place compared to the traumatic realities 
explored here. What is needed is a renewed definition of narrative identity that deals with 
the uncomfortable reality that peoples’ capacities to process experience and live it out in 
a healthy fashion are profoundly different due to individual and social trauma. These 
traumas are not pleasant for all involved, and it may seem tempting to ignore the damage 
brought forth into others’ lives. However, if we accept narrative identity as one of the 
major ways people encounter the world and themselves- and if we wish to study and 
                                                            
116 Quoted in Felman 1995: 48. 
117 Felman 1995: 48. 
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employ that identity in a positive manner on personal lives and on communities- then we 
must address the fact that storytelling is not a objective process and tool that people can 
activate equally and automatically. The daily experience of encountering life can be 
distorted into a fragmented process where lingering questions about one’s self and place 
in the world reoccur and haunt a person like ghosts.
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Conclusions, Limitations, and Steps Forward 
 As I stated at the beginning of this thesis, I wade into this topic with caution, for it 
is easy to generalize and obfuscate the matter at hand when personal lives, relationships, 
and divine implications are at stake. However, I argue that this thesis makes a strong case 
that the Catholic Church must take a deep look at the ways its teaching, rhetoric, and 
representatives positively or negatively affect the psyches and functioning of its LGBTQ 
individuals, families, and communities across the United States and the world. If the 
Church desires to live out justice rooted in emancipatory dignity and the notion that all 
people are to flourish as created in the image and likeness of God, then communities 
where identities are affirmed and oppressive and trauma-inducing actions and words are 
cast out are necessary. Catholicism’s doctrine, teaching, and rhetoric around LGBTQ 
individuals is not static or unchangeable, although the evolution of its application might 
seem to move at a glacial pace. Church leaders must recognize that, by excluding the 
LGBTQ community from the full participation of its teaching on love, relationship, 
marriage, identity, and all else, it performs serious harm to not only LGBTQ individuals 
and families, it damages their own families, friends, school and parish communities, and 
broader social circles. Furthermore, the Church’s moral weight and respect in the global 
dialogue around justice, compassion, and love may continue to be seen as hypocritical if 
injustice and damage continues to be perpetuated by its own hand. I was limited in my 
effort by time, resources, and my external vantage point as an Catholic ally into the 
trauma and oppression experienced by many within and outside the Church. Thus, my 
proposals for steps forward include projects and suggestions that I hope a diverse chorus 
of scholars, practitioners, parishioners, and decision-makers take up and make their own. 
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Firstly, there is a need for more qualitative and quantitative surveying about the 
lives and experiences of LGBTQ Catholics around the world. More and more 
autobiographical voices must rise to the public square, whether they be in the form of 
interviews, essays, books, academic chapters, social media or blog posts, and all else 
found in our rapidly evolving shared social medium. Creative and honest self-telling 
clearly brings truths and moves people in deep ways, and those voices are desperately 
needed in order to paint a clear, sober picture of the realities facing LGBTQ people in the 
Church. This is tied to a greater interdisciplinary need to explore the nature of trauma as 
it relates to identity and community. I made an effort to present some aspects of trauma 
theory on its own merits in this thesis in order to let readers wrestle with whether it can 
apply to the lives of LGBTQ individuals in the Church, even those who have not directly 
experienced assault, physical violence, or other characteristic trauma inducing events. 
The disciplines of philosophy, theology, psychology, sociology, literature, cognitive 
science, and more must come together to explore how identities and bodies seem to be 
fractured over time by a distortion of self-worth and cohesion, especially in the light of a 
divine sense of ‘rightness’. 
Secondly, the Church must take ownership of its vision of justice; although that 
may seem an unwieldy and impractical demand for a sprawling institution that defines 
itself as having both physical, earthly dimensions and a universal, transcendental 
community, practical efforts must be undertaken if any notion of justice is to be extended 
to the LGBTQ community. This may eventually take the form of admittance of fault, 
wrongdoing, and inflicted trauma and oppression; however, the Church moves slowly, 
and it would be foolish to anticipate the ways this process might fully unfold. It seems 
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apparent, though, that some of the logical inconsistencies of the theological basis for 
differential treatment of LGBTQ Catholics must be addressed and changed in order to 
articulate any renewed sense of justice and dignity for the entire Church community. 
Other work can and must be done to fully explore the exact changes to theology; 
however, if the Catechism of the Church continues to view homosexual inclination as 
“objectively disordered” and acts as “intrinsically disordered” and roots that position in 
Scripture and natural law, then it is near-certain that cyclical trauma and oppression will 
continue to debilitate the lives of LGBTQ Catholics.118 I do not presume to speculate on 
how exactly this can or must unfold, although in acknowledgment of the complexity of 
the issue, I look to McGinley’s reference of Mark Jordan’s prediction: 
Correcting Catholic teachings on homosexuality is not only or mainly a matter of 
proposing amendments to specific documents. The official doctrine is more deeply 
embedded than that. It is more deeply connected to old arrangements of institutional 
power. Changing the language without reforming the teaching would be useless, even if it 
were possible. The most important relations between Catholicism and homosexuality are 
not embedded in official propositions about homosexuality, nor even in official 
regulations for homosexual behavior. The forces at work here are not only the forces of 
words.119 
 
Thirdly, allies and witnesses around the world must continue to voice that the 
LGBTQ community is not alone on its journey toward acceptance, flourishing, and a just 
and full life within and outside the Church. Like all movements toward justice, key 
watershed moments seemingly open the floodgates toward greater understanding, 
processing, and change. One area where I see this happening is bringing the lessons and 
truths of trauma, identity, justice, and community further into the storytelling realm, in 
whatever form that might take.. Stories like Uncle Tom’s Cabin and The Things They 
                                                            
118 CCC 2357-2359. 
119 Mark Jordan, Silence, 4, qtd. in McGinley 157. 
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Carried may not have been factual accounts, but they spoke deeper truths that moved 
people into action. We may very well be on the verge of such a moment for the Catholic 
Church. It will take all of this and notes I undoubtedly miss here in this effort.  
On that note, Pope Francis recently released his long anticipated post-Synodal 
apostolic exhortation on the family, Amoris Laetitia.  It would be naïve to attempt to fully 
unpack the document given its length and complexity; however, a few excerpts from the 
exhortation offer a strange paradox. The language of the exhortation contains both signs 
of hope about recognizing the complexities of the family and love lives of Catholics and 
a continued narrative that the sexual identities and lives of LGBTQ Catholics are 
problems to be solved, rather than realities to be celebrated. Francis highlights the need 
for conscience in engaging in moral and spiritual decision making and advocates for a 
global admittance of complexities of family life throughout the document, ranging from 
situations of the divorced and remarried to the plight of families torn apart by unfortunate 
circumstances. However, when discussing homosexuality in sections 250 and 251, the 
line in the sand remained clear: 
The Church makes her own the attitude of the Lord Jesus, who offers his boundless love to each 
person without exception. During the Synod, we discussed the situation of families whose 
members include persons who experience same-sex attraction, a situation not easy either for 
parents or for children. We would like before all else to reaffirm that every person, regardless of 
sexual orientation, ought to be respected in his or her dignity and treated with consideration, 
while ‘every sign of unjust discrimination’ is to be carefully avoided, particularly any form of 
aggression and violence. Such families should be given respectful pastoral guidance, so that those 
who manifest a homosexual orientation can receive the assistance they need to understand and 
fully carry out God’s will in their lives.120 
 
And, immediately afterward: 
 
In discussing the dignity and the mission of the family, the Synod Fathers observed that, “as for 
proposals to place unions between homosexual persons on the same level as marriage, there are 
                                                            
120 Pope Francis, Amoris Laetitia, 250. 
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absolutely no grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar or remotely 
analogous to God’s plan for marriage and family.”121 
 
These two lines show how the contradiction of Church rhetoric lives on. Although we 
should respect dignity, attempt to assess the realities of lived situations of Catholic 
families, and avoid all “unjust discrimination”, unions and relationships are not even 
“remotely analogous” to heterosexual ones, and the spirit and letter of “intrinsic disorder” 
live on.122 This flies in the face of the lived testimony and philosophical analysis in this 
limited work and the countless voices from elsewhere, and underscores the urgency for 
an accelerated effort to bring all parties involved to the table so joy and justice can 
replace numbing, anger, and despair. 
 Despite the foreboding tone of the ending of this thesis, all is not lost. The very 
act of identifying different sorts of traumas and oppression publicly acts as a small crack 
in structure of injustice and damage, and starts processes that unfold in real time in 
communities around the world every day. The testimonies referenced in this work show 
how both academic work and narratives serve as purveyors of “reconciliatory 
emancipation,” as Toinette Eugene phrases it, and help bring about both pragmatic, direct 
change and sacramental healing.123 Blame, fault, and justice are necessary, but they 
unavoidably go hand in hand with healing and reconciliation in the end. In this sense, 
philosophy helps us casts light onto darkness. Indeed, to quote Matthew 10:27: 
What I say to you in the dark, tell in the light; and what you hear whispered, proclaim 
from the housetops.124
                                                            
121 Ibid 251. 
122 CCC 1357 and Amoris Laetitia 251. 
123 Toinette M. Eugene, “Reconciliation”, 13-14, qtd. in McGinley 161. 
124 Matthew 10:27 NRSV. 
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